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This paper investigates changes in and patterns of income inequality in South 
Africa during the post-apartheid period 1994 to 2004. While findings show a 
rapidly growing high-income African population (a trend that began before 
1994 and continued thereafter) as well as rising real wages for workers in 
formal employment, overall levels of income inequality have not been declining 
This is due to rising unemployment and a small informal sector that have 
therefore left unchanged South Africa's high level of income inequality. If 
anything, overall inequality has worsened.  Inter-racial inequality has 
decreased while intra-racial inequality has increased. Opportunities have 
improved for some African people in South Africa, but not for all: a lack of 
human and social capital leaves many with little chance of rising out of poverty; 
AIDS-related mortality and morbidity are likely to exacerbate stratification and 




Throughout the apartheid period, South Africa was notorious for having one of the 
highest levels (if not the highest level) of inequality in the distribution of income.  
Many South Africans hoped that political change would reduce income inequality. 
  Now, ten years after the first democratic elections of 1994, we can begin to 
determine whether the level and patterns of income inequality have changed.  This 
paper reviews evidence on income inequality in post-apartheid South Africa.  What 
is striking are the continuities from the preceding decade.  The changes that 
occurred in post-apartheid South Africa were the continuation of changes that were 
evident before 1994.  There continued to be rapid upward mobility into the upper 
classes and income deciles by black South Africans, and urban workers benefited 
from rising wages.  But unemployment grew, the informal and smallholder 
agricultural sectors remained stagnant, and the ranks of the poor swelled.   
Inequality remained as high, if not higher, than ever, even if inter-racial 
differentials declined.  The expansion of opportunities at the top did not result in 
significant improvements for most of the people at the bottom.  An accompanying 
paper (Seekings and Nattrass 2004) examines how post-apartheid public policies 
have shaped these patterns of income inequality, including through direct 





1. Overall Levels of Inequality after Apartheid 
 
The study of inequality since 1993 has been aided by an explosion in the 
availability and accessibility of survey data, especially data on incomes (Seekings, 
2001).  The first of these surveys was the 1993 PSLSD, run by the University of 
Cape Town.  Thereafter the post-apartheid state invested considerable sums in the 
measurement of incomes through countrywide sample surveys, including 
especially the 1995 and 2000 Income and Expenditure Surveys (IESs) and the 
annual October Household Surveys (OHSs) between 1994 and 1999.  These data-
sets are in a completely different league to the data that scholars had to use prior to 
1993.  Notable research using Population Census data include McGrath (1983) and 
Simkins (1979), later extended by Whiteford and McGrath (1994, 1998) and then 
Whiteford and Van Seventer (2000).  This work is immensely valuable, especially 
if combined with local studies, but – as the authors themselves were the first to 
emphasise – was limited by the crudity of the measurement of income in the 
census.  Combining data from the PSLSD and wage data with data from the 
Population Censuses, Simkins sought to improve on analyses that relied on census 
data alone (CDE, 1995).   
 
Subsequent data from the IESs and OHSs, using representative country-wide 
samples much larger than the PSLSD samples, should have made a major 
contribution to our understanding of changes in income distribution over time.   
However, the data from the IESs and OHSs are of uncertain value in the study of 
changes over time.  The value of any survey data depends on the sample being 
representative of the general population.  Achieving a representative sample is 
extraordinarily difficult in South Africa, primarily because of uneven response 
rates among different classes (with the rich, including most white people, being 
difficult to interview).  If the IES sample comprised at least representative samples 
within each racial group, then the use of appropriate weights to scale up the results 
would provide an adequate representation of overall inequality.  In practice, 
however, there remain significant doubts about the quality of both the racial 
samples and the inter-racial weights used in the IES.  In particular, the weights 
estimated by Statistics South Africa (Stats SA) for racial groups in 2000 seem to 
underestimate the size of the white population, notwithstanding emigration. This is 
potentially consequential for the analysis of racial income shares and overall 
patterns of inequality.  It also appears very likely that the 2000 IES under-sampled 
higher-income African households, and made no allowance for this in any of the 
weights used.  This would have the effect of over-estimating inter-racial disparities 
and under-estimating intra-African inequality and overall income inequality. 




OHSs: incomes are recorded in different ways and the samples vary, complicating 
the task of plotting trends over time. 
 
The analysis in this section uses data from Population Censuses as well as from the 
1995 and 2000 IESs.  At the time of writing, income data from the 2001 Population 
Census was still unavailable, so the most recent census data was from 1996.  The 
IES data is presented with two sets of figures for 2000: one set is derived using the 
implausible StatsSA weights and the second using a set of revised weights, 
calculated by Simkins and Woolard. The figures derived using the revised weights 
will be discussed in the text.  However, even with the use of revised weights, the 
IES data should be treated with caution.  One of the reasons for this is that even the 
revised Simkins/Woolard weights weight by race and province only, and so make 
no adjustment for under-counting upper-income African households.  Put another 
way, upper-income white households are taken into account because they are white 
and most white households are upper-income, but upper-income African 
households are not.  The calculations using census data are by Whiteford and Van 
Seventer (2000); the calculations using IES data are unpublished work by Murray 
Leibbrandt.  We also report Simkins’ estimates of racial income shares, based on 
his combination of PSLSD, wage and census data. 
 
 
1.1 Overall Trends in Inequality 
 
The census data suggest that overall levels of inequality changed little through the 
second half of the twentieth century.  The Gini coefficient for gross income 
inequality hovered in the high 0.6s.  IES data suggests that inequality worsened 
between 1995 and 2000, with the Gini coefficient for per capita incomes rising 
from 0.65 to 0.69 (using the StatsSA weights) or 0.70 (using revised weights).  
Fedderke et al. (2003: 20-2) show that the 1996-99 OHSs also show an upward 
trend in inequality.  Figure 1 plots Lorenz curves for household income per capita 
using data from the 1995 and 2000 IESs.
1  The Gini coefficients suggest that the 
under-weighting of white households in the IES 2000 resulted in a small under-
estimate of the extent of this post-1995 increase in inequality. 
 
The IES collected data on expenditures as well as incomes.  The expenditure data 
needs to be treated with as much caution as the income data.  Whilst the IES sought 
to ensure that income and expenditure data reconciled, there was a much weaker 
correlation between household income and household expenditure in 2000 than in 
                                                           




1995.  Taken at face value, however, the expenditure data appears to indicate the 
same general trend as the income data. The Gini coefficient for expenditure per 
capita rose from 0.65 in 1995 to 0.68 in 2000 (using the revised weights).   
Inequality increased, although the increase is less than that measured using income 
data.  One reason why the expenditure and income data suggest different rates of 
growth of inequality is that expenditure and income data diverged sharply among 
low income earners in 2000.  Between 1995 and 2000, the IES income data 
indicate the incomes of low-income households dropped sharply in both real and 
nominal terms.  Whereas the income and expenditure data correlate in 1995, in 
2000 these low-income households record incomes inexplicably lower than their 
expenditures.  This serves as yet another salutary reminder that ‘findings’ on trends 
may be sensitive to the ways in which data are collected, and especially changes in 
the ways in which data are collected.  
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Source: 1995 IES and 2000 IES, plotted by Davis Lam. 
 
Figure 1: Lorenz Curves, Household Income, 1995/2000 
 
 
1.2 Inter-racial Inequality 
 
Whilst overall levels of inequality might have changed little, there has been a 




1, census data suggests that the white population’s share of total income declined 
from about 71 percent in 1970 to 52 percent in 1996 whilst the African 
population’s share rose from about 20 percent to 36 percent (Whiteford and Van 
Seventer, 2000: 12).  Estimates by Simkins using census and other data for a 
shorter time period suggest that inter-racial disparities were lower than indicated by 
census data alone, but the trend was the same (CDE, 1995: 16-17).  
 
 
Table 1: Racial income shares, 1970-2000 
 
  Censuses  Censuses + wage data + 
PSLSD 
IESs 






  % % % % %  %  %  % %  %  % 
White  71 65 60 52 59  54  54  52 49  46  40 
African  20 25 30 36 29  33  33  34 39  40  46 
Coloured  7 7 7 8 8  9  9  9 7  9  9 
Asian  2 3 4 4 4  5  5  5 5  5  5 
Total  100 100 100 100 100  100  100  100 100  100  100 
Sources: Census data from Whiteford and Van Seventer (2000: 12); combined census, wage and PSLSD data from 
CDE (1995); IES data from unpublished research by Murray Leibbrandt. 
 
IES data on incomes suggest that this trend continued to 2000, although the pace of 
change is very sensitive to the choice of weights.  The white population’s share of 
total income declined from 49 percent to 40 percent between 1995 and 2000, if you 
use the Stats SA weights for 2000 – but only to 46 percent if you use the revised 
weights.  The revised weights suggest that the African share was creeping rather 
than galloping up. 
 
These trends were also reflected in the shifting racial composition of the higher 
income deciles.  By 1996, Whiteford and Van Seventer found that African 
households comprised 22 percent of the richest decile (see Table 2).  As inter-racial 
inequality declined, so intra-racial inequality rose. Indeed, the rising share of 
income of the black population between 1991 and 1996 was due to the marked 
increase in the income share of the growing black elite (ibid).  A comparison of the 
income data in the 1995 and 2000 IESs suggests that these trends continued 
(although, as noted above, the 2000 IES probably included too few higher income 
African households).  Even across the short five-year period between the two 
surveys, the racial composition of the top two income deciles shifted dramatically. 
As shown in Table 2, however, this finding is also sensitive to the weights used in 
the 2000 IES.  The white proportion of the top decile was 73 percent in 1995 and 




proportion of the top decile thus dropped by either 12 percentage points (a lot) or 
18 percentage points (probably too much to be credible).  The brain drain among 
white professionals and managers – and graduating students aspiring to those 
occupations – is likely to have freed up some more ‘space at the top’ for black 
professionals and managers, but precisely how much space is unclear because we 
have such unreliable data on emigration (see Brown et al., 2002) as well as the 
remaining white population.  Even using the more conservative, revised 2000 
weights, there were by 2000 about as many African households in the top income 
quintile (i.e. the top two deciles combined) as there were white households. 
 
 
Table 2: Racial composition of top two income deciles, 1975-2000 
 
Censuses IESs 






% % % %  %  % 
White  95 83 65 73  61  55 
African 2 9 22  18  25  31 
Coloured  2 4 7 4  9  9 
Asian  1 3 5 5  5  5 
10
th (richest) income decile 
Total  100 100 100 100  100  100 
White  83 61 42 38  22  17 
African  7  22 39 46  55  61 
Coloured 7  11  12  9  15  15 
Asian  3 6 7 7  8  7 
9
th (richest) income decile 
Total  100 100 100 100  100  100 
Sources: Census data from Whiteford and Van Seventer (2000 15). IES data (using per capita income deciles) from 
unpublished research by Murray Leibbrandt. 
Note: There was no census in 1975, so the 1975 data are actually estimates made by McGrath, extrapolating from 
1970 census data. 
 
 
1.3 Intra-racial Inequality 
 
Declining inter-racial inequality was accompanied by rising intra-racial inequality. 
 This is evident from changes in the Gini coefficients for the distribution of income 
for South Africa as a whole and the different racial populations within it.  Table 3 
reports the Gini coefficients calculated from census data (by Whiteford and Van 
Seventer, 2000) and IES data.  Not only are the post-1991 intra-racial Ginis high 
(especially for the African population), but there is a clear upward trend.  (There is 
little difference between the Stats SA and revised weights with respect to the Gini 
coefficients because the revised weights only took into account race and province; 








Table 3: Gini coefficients for the distribution of household income, 1975-
2000 
 
 Censuses  IESs   






African 0.47  0.62  0.66  0.56  0.61  0.61 
White 0.36  0.46  0.50  0.44  0.46  0.46 
Coloured 0.51  0.52  0.56  0.50  0.55  0.54 
Asian 0.45  0.49  0.52  0.47  0.50  0.49 
all South Africa  0.68  0.68  0.69  0.65  0.70  0.69 
Sources: Census data from Whiteford and Van Seventer (2000): 16; IES data (using individual 
rather than household level data, allocating per capita household income to all household 
members) from unpublished research by Murray Leibbrandt.   
Note: Gini coefficients for household income will be lower than Gini coefficients for per capita 
household income in a society, like South Africa, where poorer households are larger than richer 
households. 
 
The declining importance of inter-racial inequality and rising importance of intra-
racial inequality are also evident in decompositions using census data (conducted 
by Whiteford and van Seventer) and IES data.  The Theil statistic is the most 
commonly used, additively decomposable measure of inequality (see further 
Bhorat, Leibbrandt et al., 2001: 24-28).   
 
The Theil statistic allows for decomposition into ‘within group’ (e.g. intra-racial) 
and between group’ (e.g. inter-racial) components.  The results of decomposing 
inequality using racial groups demonstrate the steadily declining importance of 
inter-racial inequality and rising importance of intra-racial inequality (Table 4).  In 
1975, the ‘between-group’, inter-racial contribution to overall inequality was 
almost twice as important as the ‘within-group’, intra-racial contribution, but by 
the late 1990s this ratio was reversed.
2 
                                                           
2  One caveat needs to be added to this general conclusion.  The expenditure data from the 2000 
IES tells a rather different story to the income data, but this appears to be due to inconsistencies 
in the measurement of expenditure and income in poorer households.  Because the 2000 IES 
recorded a substantial drop in household expenditure at the bottom end, the Theil decomposition 















% % % %  %  % 
Within group 
inequality 
38 58 67 56  59  54 
Between group 
inequality 
62 42 33 44  41  46 
Total 100  100  100  100  100  100 
Sources: Census data from Whiteford and Van Seventer (2000: 17); IES data (using individual 
rather than household level data, allocating per capita household income to all household 




2. Getting Ahead: The New African Elite and 
‘Middle’ Classes 
 
The accelerating growth of the African elite and ‘middle’ classes was perhaps the 
most dramatic shift in the social landscape of post-apartheid South Africa.   
Whiteford and van Seventer’s analysis in 2000 of census data indicates the extent 
to which the benefits of changing incomes in the 1990s were concentrated in this 
group.  Dividing each racial group into income deciles or quintiles, they calculate 
the growth in income between 1991 and 1996 that can be attributed to economic 
growth and add the aggregate income losses experienced by ‘loser groups’ (i.e. 
most white income quintiles).  They then examine how this ‘income’ was 
distributed among beneficiaries.  About 12 percent of the benefit went to the white 
elite (the top white income decile especially), whilst 52 percent went to the top 
African income quintile (with as much as 40 percent going to the top African 
income decile alone) (Whiteford and van Seventer, 2000: 20-22).  Another way of 
indicating the rapid growth of the high-income African population is to look at the 
numbers of households in different income categories.  Between 1991 and 1996, 
the number of households in South Africa grew by 26 percent.  The number of 
households with incomes above R72 000 p.a. in 1996 prices – which is how 




percent.  But the number of ‘middle class’ African households rose by 78 percent 
(ibid: 22-23). 
 
This growing high-income African population was generally described in the 
media as an ‘elite’ or ‘middle class’.  Seekings (2003a) defined and mapped the 
class structure of South Africa at the end of the apartheid period.  In terms of the 
class categories defined in that previous work, the new African ‘elite’ or ‘middle 
class’ were members of the ‘upper’ class  (labelled as WE1 and WE2 classes, 
referring to households earning significant income from wealth or entrepreneurial 
activity), and perhaps also the ‘semi-professional’ class comprising households 
headed by teaches or nurses.  In 1993, the first three of these classes were still 
predominantly white, whilst the semi-professional class was predominantly 
African.  In 1993, these classes were in no way in the middle of the class structure: 
the application to them of the term ‘middle’ class made little sense in the South 
African context, where the urban working class was really the middle class. 
  
 
Table 5: Sources of income of households in the top two income deciles, 
1995/2000 
 









Wages and salaries  68  60  78  74 
Profits 7  15  2  5 
Rent, interest and dividends  2  2  1  2 
Private pension  9  7  4  6 
Alimony and remittances  1  <1  3  1 
Public pensions and grants  1  <1  2  1 
Other income  12  15  10  10 
Total 100  100  100  100 
Source: IES 1995, IES 2000. 
 
The new African ‘middle’ class comprised people in salaried jobs (such as 
managers and teachers) and professionals whose income is generally treated as 
salary, as well as entrepreneurs and capitalists.  IES data indicates how much more 
important were salaried and quasi-salaried occupations than profit-generating 
activity in terms of the size distribution of income.  Table 5 reports the sources of 
income of households in the top income quintile (i.e. the ninth and tenth income 




the two surveys are striking: the relative shares of the major categories of income 
vary by implausible amounts. The share of income of the top quintile from profits 
(which includes profits from commercial farming) plummeted between the 1995 
and 2000 IESs. This is very unlikely to reflect a real trend (although profits in 
agriculture, for example, might have dropped). As ever, the IES data needs to be 
treated with caution.  What is clear is that the lion’s share of the top quintile’s total 
income came from wages and salaries, with relatively very small sums from 
profits, rents or interest and private pensions. Even at the level of the 1995 IES, 
however, it is clear that ‘black economic empowerment’ through business 
opportunities was much less important in the late 1990s in terms of changing 
patterns of income distribution than upward occupational mobility, assisted by 
affirmative action, and reflected in the distribution of salaries. 
 
 












































































































Source: Stats SA, 03-01-19 (1996), table 14.0; and 03-02-03 (2003), table 2.32. 
Note: The small number of individuals whose racial group was unspecified or ‘other’ in 1996 is included in the totals. 
 
Analysis of these high-income earning classes is difficult because of the 
shortcomings of available data.  In South Africa, response rates in surveys and 
censuses are closely, and inversely, correlated with income: response rates are low 
in high-income areas and high in low-income areas.  This makes it difficult to plot 
the growth of the African high-income population.  Table 6 reports the breakdown 
of top occupational categories by race from the 1996 and 2001 censuses.  Overall, 
the number of people in these high-income occupations rose, by 18 percent 
between the two censuses.  But there were big variations between occupational 




category grew strongly, the professional category shrank – but this decline was 
accounted for by declining numbers of African and coloured professionals, not 
white and Indian professionals.  At the same time, the number of African and 
coloured “technicians and associate professionals” rose very rapidly.  The number 
of African professionals declined by 43 percent whilst the number of African 
technicians and associate professionals rose by an incredible 173 percent.  Shifts of 
this scale over this time period are simply not possible.  What is possible is that 
occupations were classified differently in the two censuses.  Overall, the number of 
African men and women in these categories grew more strongly than the number 
of white men and women, with the result that the African share was, by 2001, 
almost equal to the white share.  But it is also possible that the data is simply too 
unreliable for analysis of this sort.  The coverage might have changed sharply 
between censuses.  
 
 











LFS CEE LFS CEE LFS CEE  LFS* 
 
% % % % % %  % 
African 25 14 35 42 52 29  41 
Coloured  7 7 8 7  11  13  9 
Indian 7 5 7 6 4 6  5 
White  60 74 50 45 33 52  44 
Total  100 100 100 100 100 100  100 
Source: own calculations from original LFS data; CEE data from Department of Labour (2003). 
Note: * The CEE data cannot be aggregated because the CEE reports it in percentages only. 
 
The Labour Force Surveys, conducted by Stats SA twice per year since 2000, are 
another possible source of data on the racial composition of the top income deciles 
or high-income occupations.  The state used data from the LFSs to calculate the 
“official” unemployment rate, so it might be thought that the LFS data is more 
accurate than the Population Census.  The results from the February 2001 LFS are 
shown in Table 7, together with data from the Department of Labour’s Commission 
on Employment Equity (from Department of Labour, 2003).  The LFS data are 
extraordinarily similar to the Population Census data.  Moreover, a comparison of 
the February 2001 LFS with the other LFSs between February 2000 and March 




top occupational categories.  By March 2003, the number of African men and 
women in the three occupational categories combined was almost the same as the 
number of white men and women. 
 
The statistics released by the Commission for Employment Equity indicated lower 
rates of African influx into these higher-paid occupations.  But the coverage of 
these statistics is known to be very limited.  The statistics were based on 
information filed by employers under the Employment Equity Act.  But data was 
only available for under 3.5 million employees, which was only just over 10 
percent of the economically active population.  Most small employers never filed 
the information.   
 
Overall, there was clearly strong upward mobility by African men and women into 
higher-income occupations.  This was especially pronounced in the public sector.  
Thompson and Woolard (2002) used public sector payroll (PERSAL) data from 
the Department of Public Service Administration to assess the changing racial 
composition of the upper ranks of the public sector between 1995 and 2001.  Table 
8 shows that the proportion of managers (at all levels) who were African rose from 
30 percent in 1995 to over 51 percent in 2001, with the total black proportion rising 
from 40 percent to over 63 percent.  The change in the composition of senior 
management was more muted, but nevertheless there were more black than white 
senior managers by 2001 and almost as many African as white senior managers.  
The racial composition of non-managerial staff in the public sector also shifted, 
with the African (and black) proportion rising and white proportion falling. 
 
 
Table 8: Racial composition of top occupational categories, public sector, 
1995/2001  
 
Public sector managers 
(all levels) 
Public sector senior 
managers 
1995 2001 1995 2001 
 
% % % % 
African  30.0 51.1 33.3 42.7 
Coloured  6.7 6.6 2.0 5.8 
Indian  3.4 5.7 2.0 6.0 
Total  black  40.1 63.4 37.3 54.5 
White  59.9 36.6 62.7 45.5 
Total  100 100 100 100 





Entry into these high-income occupations was in part a function of changing 
enrolment patterns in higher education institutions.  Between 1988 and 1998, 
student enrolment in higher education was transformed, with the proportion of 
African students rising from 29 percent (in 1988) to 45 percent (in 1993) to 56 
percent (in 1998).  In 1994, there were about equal numbers of white and African 
students in higher education; by 1999, there were almost twice as many African as 
white students (Cooper and Subotzky, 2001: 14; Cloete and Bunting, 2000: 18-19). 
  But, as Cooper and Subotzky (2001) put it, this was a ‘skewed revolution’.   
African students tended to complete fewer years of higher education, be enrolled in 
technikons rather than top universities, and be under-represented in the more 
professional courses (such as engineering and accountancy).  Higher education 
institutions turned out very large numbers of African men and women with 
qualifications for ‘middle’ class jobs, but relatively fewer for the very highest 




3. Wages, Employment and Unemployment 
 
The growth of the African upper (or so-called ‘middle’) classes was both dramatic 
and visible, but was not the only change in the social landscape.  Falling formal 
employment is probably the key defining feature of economic growth in the 1990s. 
 As can be seen in Figure 2, non-agricultural formal private employment, and – to a 
lesser extent also public employment – fell across the decade.  The magnitude of 
this fall is especially dramatic in the mining industry.  The ‘stabilisation’ of mine-
labour in the 1980s – i.e. the shift from employing larger numbers of less skilled 
workers on short contracts to smaller numbers of more skilled permanent workers 
– had dire consequences in rural areas that had relied on migrant labour.   
Agricultural employment also fell, compounding the problem.  Unskilled labour 
were particularly hard hit by these sectoral trends. 
 
It should be noted, however, that there was some uncertainty about South African 
labour statistics, and especially the extent to which economic growth was ‘jobless’. 
 Table 9 shows how different sources generated very different pictures of the South 
African labour market.  Figure 2 is based on data from the South African Reserve 
Bank, using surveys of firms.  It shows a decline in employment in the late 1990s.  
Data from household surveys (such as the OHSs), in contrast, suggests that there 




employment.  LFS data from the early 2000s seems to indicate even higher levels 
of employment (at the same time as higher unemployment rates).   
 
One of the problems with using data from firm-based surveys is that they 
typically under-estimate employment because informal sector firms are difficult 
to survey.  Data from household surveys are better able to capture the number of 
people working.  But the definition of ‘work’ is rather different in household 
level labour force surveys to that understood at the level of the firm.  According 
to the standard labour force approach, anyone working for gain for one morning 
a week is counted as ‘employed’ even though this would not fit into most 
popular notions of what it means to have a job.  By conflating employment and 
under-employment, employment is typically over-estimated in such household 
surveys.  For example, Klasen and Woolard (1999) have shown that if 
employment in the 1995 OHS is re-estimated in terms of ‘full-time equivalents’ 
(i.e. someone working only twenty hours per week is counted as half employed 
rather than fully employed), then employment falls and the broad unemployment 
rate rises by three percentage points. 
 
 
Table 9. Employment according to different sources (‘000s), 1996-2002 
 
  October Household Survey    Labour Force Survey   
1996 1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002 
Non-agricultural formal 
sector 
5,242 5,139 4,945  4,840  6,678  6,678  7,036 
Commercial agriculture  757  699  734 















Informal sector  996  1,136 1,316  1,907  1,821  2,665  1,767 
Domestic service  740  668  749  799  1,001  914  972 
Total employed  9,287  9,247 9,390  10,369  11,880  11,837  11,393
South African Reserve Bank data*  
 1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002 
Non-agricultural 
employment  
5,233 5,144 4,965  4,864  4,734  4,658  4,663 
Sources: Statistics South Africa, PO210 September, 2002; Statistics South Africa PO317, 31 July 
2000; South African Quarterly Bulletin, June 2003 and September 2002. 
Note: * This South African Reserve Bank data draws on data from Statistics South Africa including 
the survey of Employment and Earnings in selected industries. 
 
Taken together, the data in Figure 2 and Table 9 suggest that formal non-
agricultural employment was probably strongly negative during the 1990s, but 




some extent by a rise in informal ‘employment’.  However, given high levels of 
under-employment and low incomes in the informal sector, this ‘employment’ 
growth must be treated with a great deal of circumspection.  
 
Those who lost employment (or failed to find it) were the big losers in the 1990s.  
By contrast, most of the employed and owners of capital did relatively well 
(Seekings and Nattrass 2004). Fedderke and Mariotti (2002) show that the 
proportion of skilled workers in manufacturing rose sharply from 1990 and that 
this was associated with rising wages.  Employment shedding in commercial 
mines and farms also contributed to the shift away from unskilled employment 
in South Africa over the decade (Edwards, 2001; Simbi and Aliber, 2000).   
Some of those who lost formal jobs may have been rehired as ‘casual’ workers.  
Many, however, joined the ranks of the unemployed.  Other studies point to the 
shift from unskilled to skilled labour across a range of sectors (Bhorat and 





































































Source: Data from the South African Reserve Bank. 
 
Figure 2.  Trends in non-agricultural formal employment, 1990-2002 
 
 
The 1990s saw continuing ‘re-segmentation’ of the labour market, with a 
deepening divide between workers in formal, regular employment and those in 




extent of this re-segmentation remained unclear, however.  On the one hand, there 
were many reports of changing employment relationships (e.g. ILO, 1999; House 
and Williams, 2000; Valodia, 2000).  On the other hand, surveys conducted by the 
International Labour Organisation in the mid-1990s suggested that flexible 
employment relationships in manufacturing were not as widespread as had been 
expected.  As much as 93 percent of the manufacturing workforce was in regular, 
full-time employment (Crankshaw, 1997).  The Labour Force Surveys of the early 
2000s provide few indications of any significant casualisation of employment.   
About 80 percent of people working for someone else for pay said (in March 2003) 
that they were in permanent employment, 4 percent were in fixed period contracts, 
10 percent were temporary and only 6 percent were casual.  Less than 2 percent 
said their employment was seasonal.  Very few workers said they were paid by a 
labour broker, contractor or agency.  Between 2000 and 2003, the proportion of 
working people without a written contract actually declined slightly. 
 
There is some evidence from surveys on the relative fortunes of different 
categories of workers.  The advantages experienced by formally-employed 
workers (especially those with skills) have persisted in post-apartheid South 
Africa. Analysis of changes in individual earnings of African people in 
KwaZulu-Natal – using the 1993 PSLSD and 1998 KwaZulu-Natal Income 
Dynamics Study (KIDS) data – shows that the real earnings of workers in 
regular employment rose by 30 percent between 1993 and 1998, compared to an 
overall average change in earnings of just 7 percent (Cichello et al., 2001: 130). 
 The earnings of workers in regular employment grew faster than the average for 
everyone in the sample.  Some of this spectacular increase was because new 
entrants into formal employment had higher wages than those who left.  But 
even among workers who were in formal employment in both 1993 and 1998, 
earnings rose by 20 percent (ibid: 132).   
 
This does not mean that all members of these classes prospered. The earnings of 
workers who lost or left their jobs plummeted.  The aggregate gains of workers 
in regular employment should not obscure the fact that the composition of this 
group shifted.  The 1993/1998 KwaZulu-Natal data have not been disaggregated 
into discrete occupational classes, but it is likely that white-collar and skilled 








Unlike most employed workers and capitalists, the unemployed were 
unambiguous losers during the 1990s.  Since 1993, unemployment rates have 
risen steadily.  Table 10 presents data on unemployment rates from the PSLSD 
survey of 1993, the official OHSs of 1994-99 and their successors, the Labour 
Force Surveys (LFSs) of 2000-02.  Unemployment rates rose in terms of both 
the official (i.e. strict) and expanded unemployment rates.    
 
  
Table 10.  Unemployment Rates Since 1993 
 
PSLSD  OHS, 1994-99  LFS, 2000-02   
1993  1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Unemployment 
(official, strict) 
12,7  20,0    16,9    19,3 21,0    25,2 23,3 26,7 26,4 29,4 31,2 




29,4  31,5   29,2   33,0   36,0   37,5  36,2  35,5  37,0  40,9  42,1 
Sources: Klasen and Woolard (1999: 11); CSS, Statistical News Release P0317.10, 13 August 1998; Statistics South 
Africa, Statistical News Release P0317 18 May 2000; Statistical News Release PO317 31 July 2000; Statistical News 
Release, PO210, September 2002; Statistical News Release, PO210, 23 September 2003. 
Notes: The PSLSD and OHS unemployment rates are not strictly comparable due to differences in survey 
design. For example, the OHS asked respondents if they had looked for work in the past month (rather than in 
the preceding fortnight), and defined as broadly unemployed those who had not searched for work, but who 
would accept a ‘suitable’ job (rather than asking about why they had not searched for work).  This probably 
accounts for the smaller rates of unemployment found in the PSLSD survey compared to the OHS in the early 
1990s.  The LFS figures are all for February.  Note that the OHS figures for 1996 and 1997 have been re-weighted to 
adjust for the lack of inclusion of mining hostels in the sample.  The figures for OHS 1998 and 1999 include mining 
hostels in the sample. 
 
Despite some differences in survey and sampling design, post-1993 surveys 
showed a remarkably consistent pattern: unemployment was higher for Africans 
than other population groups; higher for women than men; and higher in rural 
than urban areas. These patterns hold irrespective of whether unemployment was 
measured in strict or expanded ways.  Table 11 shows how rural African women 
were the most disadvantaged with respect to access to the labour market: 40 
percent of them wanted work and were actively seeking work, and a further 20 
percent wanted work but had given up actively seeking it.  Unemployment rates 
were particularly high in the old ‘homeland’ areas (Dinkelman and Piroux, 
2002: 879), illustrating one of the more pernicious legacies of apartheid. 
 
The rise in unemployment contributed greatly to widening inequality in South 
Africa.  In South Africa, where there was no subsistence agricultural sector to 




Unemployment rates were closely – and inversely – related to income in South 
Africa, being lowest in the rich deciles and highest in the poor deciles (Seekings 
2000).  According to research by Meth and Dias (2003: 7-9) using expenditure 
data from the 1999 OHS and the September 2002 LFS, the number of people in 
poverty rose by between 3.7 and 4.2 million, and this was closely connected to 
the rise in the number of unemployed (about 2 million) over the same period. 
 
 
Table 11. Unemployment Rates (%) by Urban/Rural Location and 
Gender, 1999 
 
Urban Non-urban  Total   
Male Female Male Female Male Female  All 
Official (strict) 
unemployment 
       
African  24,1 35,0 25,2 34,9 24,5 35,0 29,2 
Total 
population 
18,4 25,8 22,7 32,3 19,8 27,8 23,3 
Expanded  
unemployment 
       
African  33,7 48,9 40,8 55,7 36,7 51,9 44,0 
Total 
population 
26,2 37,9 37,4 52,7 30,0 43,2 36,2 
Source: OHS, Stats SA Statistical News Release P0317, 31 July 2000. 
 
During the late 1990s, there was a debate about the extent and measure of 
unemployment in South Africa (see Nattrass, 2000a).  The most substantive of 
these criticisms came from Standing et al. (1996) who argued that sampling and 
other measurement problems resulted in an over-estimation of unemployment.  
But Klasen and Woolard (1999) found that adjusting the data to take these 
problems into account had an insignificant impact on measured unemployment.   
 
A related debate concerned the size of South Africa’s ‘informal’ sector.  Might 
South Africa’s unemployment rate be over-estimated because people working in 
the informal sector do not classify themselves as doing a ‘real job’ and hence 
report themselves as ‘unemployed’ to survey researchers?  The problem with 
this suggestion is that labour force statisticians classify people as ‘employed’ if 
they report conducting any income-earning activities, irrespective of whether the 
respondent self-reports him or herself as unemployed.  They make careful use of 
selection procedures and ‘hurdle’ questions to allocate people a labour force 




lie about all sources of labour-income to be classified as unemployed.   
Schlemmer and Worthington (1996a, 1996b) and Schlemmer and Levitz (1998) 
adopted precisely such an argument, saying that differences between the 
personal income and expenditure of unemployed people probably represented 
undeclared informal earnings.  Klasen and Woolard (1999) questioned the 
empirical basis of this claim, in part because it is difficult to draw distinctions 
between household and individual expenditure.  Furthermore, the fact that 
income and expenditure figures from the 1995 IES correlated very well did not 
support the proposition that there were large amounts of unreported income 
emanating from unregistered micro enterprises (ibid: 6).  
 
 
3.2 The Informal Sector 
 
The informal sector is certainly, and notoriously, hard to measure.  The 
operating definition of the informal sector used by Stats SA in the LFS is that 
the business is not registered as a company or for paying Value-Added Tax 
(VAT).  Anyone who reported informal activity in the past week (if only for an 
hour) was classified as being in the informal sector.  Workers who reported that 
they were working for an informal sector firm were also counted as being in the 
informal sector.  This results in at least two sources of ‘noise’ in the data that 
may account in part for the highly fluctuating measurement of informal activity 
in the LFS.  The first is that those people working irregularly in the informal 
sector may or may not get recorded as informally employed; it all depends on 
what they did in the past week.  If a high proportion of informally employed 
people only work for a few hours a week, then this kind of noise is likely.  In a 
2000 survey in Cape Town (in Khayelitsha and Mitchell’s Plain), 21 percent of 
those reporting self employment worked for ten or less hours a week.  The 
second source of noise arises from uncertainty among workers with regard to the 
status (formal or informal) of the firms for which they work.   
 
According to the October Household Surveys, informal employment rose from 
581,639 in 1997 to 743,179 in 1998 and to 1,207,366 in 1999.  In 2000, 
according to the Labour Force Survey, it rose to over 2 million (Simkins, 2003: 
6).  Simkins argues that this ‘growth’ was implausible and was probably the 
result of the OHS and the LFS getting better at measuring the informal sector 
(ibid).  He accordingly adjusts the estimates for informal sector employment 
upwards in earlier years.  This results in an increase in estimated total 
employment (i.e. formal plus informal) in all years between 1997 and 2002 
(except for 2000) (see Figure 3).  What is potentially problematic about this, 




estimated in the 2001 census (ibid).   Simkins assumes that the LFS covers the 
informal sector better than the census, but whether this can account for a 
difference of this order of magnitude remains an open question.  
 
South Africa is unusual in that it is a middle-income developing country with 
high unemployment and a relatively small informal sector.  In Latin American 
countries, workers who lose their jobs (or cannot find work) in the formal sector 
tend to find work in the informal sector (meaning in less secure, poorly 
regulated and low paying jobs).  In South Africa, those who lose formal sector 
jobs seem to end up in unemployment rather than the informal sector. Simkins 
(2003) ran paired probit regressions to see what characteristics would predict 
whether people were more likely to be actively searching for jobs (as opposed to 
being unemployed and not searching) or informally employed (as opposed to 
being unemployed and actively searching).  He found that Africans were less 
likely to be informally employed than searching for work, and that women and 
rural people were more likely to be informally employed.  Increasing education 
also made participation in the informal sector less likely (Ibid: 13).  This is 
unsurprising given that those who did end up in the informal sector, tended to 

















Source: Simkins (2003). 
 
Figure 3. Estimates of Formal, Informal and Total Employment, 1997-





This was confirmed by a survey conducted by Stats SA in March 2002 of 
businesses in South Africa that were not registered for the payment of VAT (Stats 
SA, 2002). The sample was based on a sub-sample of the LFS.  Most (69 percent) 
of the enterprises were in wholesale or retail, most (76 percent) did not add value 
through production (i.e. did not use raw materials) and fewer than 10 percent were 
in manufacturing.  About a third operated without electricity and about a third were 
without a toilet on site.  Only 15 percent employed anyone, i.e. this sector 
comprises overwhelmingly one-person trading or hawking ‘businesses’.  Average 
turnover was about R1150 per month, and average profit almost R800 per month, 
i.e. barely more than the government old-age pension.  In another survey, in 
Khayelitsha and Mitchell’s Plain (in Cape Town) in 2000, average monthly profit 
for the self-employed was R580. 
 
It was sometimes suggested that surveys were not capturing the full extent of the 
informal sector in South Africa.  This claim became less and less credible as more 
and more household surveys looked for but do not find much evidence of a 
massive informal sector.  Surveys such as the 2000 Khayelitsha / Mitchell’s Plain 
survey probed possible informal sector exhaustively, and failed to reveal 
widespread activity. 
 
The obvious question is ‘why wasn’t (and isn’t) South Africa’s informal sector 
larger?’  Put another way, what constrained prospective entrepreneurs from starting 
informal businesses, and what inhibited the accumulation of capital?  One prime 
suspect was South Africa’s labour market regulations.  In a study of ‘small, 
medium and micro enterprises’ (SMMEs), Berry et al. (2002) documented many of 
the grievances that small entrepreneurs had with labour regulations, particularly 
with regard to wage-setting and the costs of retrenchments.  Anecdotal evidence 
suggests that social obligations (including the cost of funerals) and crime often 
wiped out working capital.  Perhaps, also, there was a lack of an entrepreneurial 
culture and experience, which South Africa’s public education system did little to 
redress.  As Berry et al. concluded, however, ‘we are very far from having 




4. Short-Term Flux in Incomes 
 
The data-sets used above to assess how income distribution changed after the end 
of apartheid were all cross-sectional.  Successive cross-sectional surveys (and 




coverage, in the cases of censuses) and ask similar questions.  Panel studies 
provide a different perspective on changes over time, and have a different set of 
methodological weaknesses.  In a panel study, the same ‘panel’ of respondents is 
re-interviewed over a period of time.  This means that changes over time can be 
linked to specific characteristics.  For example, is poverty generally transitory or 
chronic, i.e. do people drop in and out of poverty as incomes fall and rise or are 
they generally stuck in poverty for long periods of time?  And, crucially in post-
apartheid South Africa, were the changing opportunities for getting rich distributed 
widely or were they limited to people who were already relatively better off?  Panel 
studies have two major drawbacks. First, the final sample is, at best, representative 
of the population at the time when the panel study was started, and does not easily 
allow for births, deaths and related demographic changes. Second, attrition 
(through the failure to re-interview members of the panel) may render the final 
sample even less representative.   
 
The first major panel data-set in South Africa that is relevant to the study of income 
dynamics was the PSLSD/KIDS data-set from KwaZulu-Natal.  African and Indian 
households interviewed in 1993 for the PSLSD were re-interviewed in 1998 by 
KIDS.  The PSLSD/KIDS data have several major limitations, for our purposes.  
First, the PSLSD/KIDS panel was not designed as a panel study in that the PSLSD 
was not intended to be the first wave of a panel.  Furthermore, the primary purpose 
of the 1998 KIDS study was to distinguish between chronic and transitory poverty 
(May and Roberts, 2001), not to probe issues of general opportunity and mobility 
directly.  The consequence of this is that neither the 1993 nor 1998 surveys asked 
many of the questions required for a thorough study of opportunities and mobility. 
 Secondly, data on income, employment status and so on were collected at just two 
points in time, five years apart.  This interval is both short – in that we can only 
analyse short-term income dynamics, i.e. dynamics over a fraction of a generation 
– and too long, in that the data tells us nothing about changes in between these two 
points in time.  There were, unfortunately, no questions in the 1998 survey on 
employment history during the previous five years.  Someone who was employed 
in both 1993 and 1998 might have been unemployed for most of the intervening 




                                                           
3  With regard to tracking reduced attrition, data on household members was generally 
provided by a single respondent in each survey, with the possibility that different members 
answered in 1993 and 1998 respectively.  The datasets also had to be pared down to exclude 




Nonetheless, the PSLSD/KIDS data do indicate clearly the importance of panel 
studies as opposed to series of cross-sectional studies.  When analysed as two 
cross-sectional surveys, the 1993 and 1998 data suggest that the average real 
earnings of workers in formal employment rose by 30 percent, i.e. that formally 
employed workers ‘got ahead’.  But analysed as a panel data set, a somewhat 
different picture emerges: the workers in formal employment in 1993 actually 
experienced, on average, a decline in real wages of 8 percent.  The difference 
was because some of the 1993 workers were no longer in formal employment in 
1998, and thus suffered huge declines in earnings.  For the workers in formal 
employment in 1993 who were in formal employment in 1998, real wages did 
indeed rise, by 20 percent.  Conversely, some of the 1998 workers had been 
unemployed or in informal employment five years previously, and thus 
experienced big increases in earnings.  Cichello et al. (2001) conclude that there 
was significant ‘churning’ in the labour market, as people’s labour market status 
changed. 
 
Income mobility needs to be analysed in terms of each of household incomes not 
just individual earnings.  Table 12 presents a transition matrix for household 
incomes, showing the destination quintiles in 1998 of households according to 
their original quintiles from 1993 (see Leibbrandt and Woolard, 2001). The table 
shows that 37 percent of households in the poorest income quintile in 1993 were 
still in the poorest income quintile in 1998, whilst 26 percent had moved up into 
the second quintile (and so on).  A total of three out of eight African households 
were in the same income quintile in each survey (see the shaded cells on the 
diagonal in Table 12).  Another three out of eight households moved into an 
adjacent income quintile, for example from the first to the second quintile.  One 
in four households moved into non-adjacent quintiles, for example from the first 
to the third
 quintile.  Most movement occurred in the middle of the distribution, 
with much less movement out of the bottom and (especially) top quintiles. 
Almost two-thirds of the households in the top quintile in 1993 were in the top 
quintile again in 1998 (and most of the new entrants to the top quintile came 
from the fourth quintile); put another way, one-third of the households in the top 
quintile in 1993 had dropped down into lower quintiles by 1997.  More than 
two-thirds of the households in the bottom quintile in 1998 had been in one or 
other of the bottom two quintiles in 1993.  Similar work has been done using 







Table 12: Income quintiles transition matrix, 1993 and 1998, African 
adults in KwaZulu-Natal 
 
                 1998 income quintiles 
1 2 3 4 5  Total 
 
% % % % % % 
1 %  37 26 17 15  5 100 
2 %  32  28 23 11  6 100 
3 %  18  24  29 21  9 100 
4 % 9  20  23  31 18  100 





Total % 100 100 100 100 100  100 
Source: Leibbrandt and Woolard (2001): Table 6. 
 
This flux was in part due to changes in individuals’ earnings (Cichello et al., 
2001).  Among working people, the individuals who suffered the biggest drop in 
earnings were those with the highest earnings to begin with, whilst the 
individuals who gained the most were those with no or low earnings in 1993.  
This is because the dominant factor behind rising and falling earnings was a 
change in an individual’s labour market status.  Only 62 percent of the 
individuals in regular employment (or what they call ‘formal’ employment) in 
1993 were in regular employment in 1998.  About 18 percent were in casual 
employment or informal sector work, about 15 percent were unemployed and 6 
percent were not available for work. The shift from regular employment to non-
employment (whether unemployed or not available for work) was, of course, 
catastrophic in terms of earnings.  The mean monthly earnings change among 
workers who were in regular employment on both dates was a gain of R189 (in 
1993 prices), somewhat better than the mean for the sample as a whole of R139. 
  But the mean for workers who changed from ‘formal’ to ‘informal’ 
employment was a loss of R152 per month, and the mean for workers who 
changed from ‘formal’ employment to no employment at all was a loss of R797 
per month.  Viewed from the other end of the labour market, one in five 
individuals who had been unemployed in 1993 was in regular employment in 
1998.  Their mean monthly earnings rose by a massive R1278.  Slightly fewer 
had moved into ‘informal’ employment (with much more modest earnings 
gains) whilst most remained unemployed (46 percent) or were no longer 
available for work (17 percent), and hence experienced no change in their 





The overall picture is perhaps most easily grasped by comparing the fortunes of 
two groups of earners.  The first group comprised the approximately 30 percent 
of working-age African men and women who had the same labour market status 
in 1993 and 1998.  They accounted for very little of the changes in earnings.  
The second group comprised the 23 percent of the sample who either moved into 
or out of ‘formal’ employment. They accounted for the lion’s share, probably 
about two-thirds, of the total change in earnings. It is likely that a high 
proportion of the individuals who moved out of ‘formal’ employment did so as a 
result of involuntary retrenchment.  In a situation of very high unemployment, 
workers who are retrenched probably have advantages over the longer-term 
unemployed in terms of finding new employment.  But having better chances of 
re-employment does not mean that the chances are good.  The result is that 
turnover in employment results in huge shifts in individual earnings. 
 
Changes in household incomes can be divided into changes due to ‘income events’, 
i.e. changes in the household’s money income, and changes due to ‘demographic 
events’, i.e. changes in the size or composition of the household (see Leibbrandt 
and Woolard, 2001). Income events accounted for about three-quarters of the 
movements into or out of poverty (defined in terms of adult equivalent income), 
with demographic events accounting for the remaining quarter.  The key income 
events were changes in the earnings from work of the household head or other 
household members.  Unsurprisingly, job losses and the acquisition of additional 
unemployed dependents both correlated with dropping behind.  In sum, the 
PSLSD/KIDS data suggest that there was considerable income mobility in post-
apartheid South Africa, due primarily to flux or ‘churning’ in the labour market as 
workers lost jobs and unemployed people (or people working in the informal 




5. Lifetime Patterns in Income Distribution  
 
Flux in the labour market meant, in the context of high unemployment rates, that 
there was flux in patterns of income distribution.  But was this flux spread 
evenly across different sections of the population?  What was the relationship 
between short-term flux and lifetime earnings and hence household incomes 
across the long-term?  Were the currently poor (at any moment) more vulnerable 
to flux so that there was a correlation between current poverty and lifetime 
poverty, or was there so much flux across the board that lifetime earnings and 





Long-run panel data (such as the Panel Study for Income Dynamics in the USA) 
can address these questions.  In the absence of any similar data in South Africa, 
we have to resort to retrospective questions about employment histories. The 
2000  Khayelitsha and Mitchell’s Plain Survey (KMPS) asked retrospective 
questions about employment history as well as family background.  The survey 
was conducted in parts of Cape Town with neither large ‘middle class’ or farm-
worker populations, but with a high unemployment rate (46 percent by the broad 
definition, 29 percent by the narrow or strict definition; see Nattrass, 2003: 77).  
All of the adults in the KMPS sample, including the unemployed and people not 
presently participating in the labour force, were asked questions about what 
proportion of their weekdays since leaving school they had spent on a number of 
activities, including ‘working as a regular wage earner’, ‘working as a casual 
worker’, ‘self-employed’, ‘working in the family business or farm’, ‘looking for 
work’, ‘domestic duties / child care’, ‘post school education and training’ and 
‘other’ (in which case, respondents were asked what was this ‘other’).   
 
Tables 13 and 14 show that there were marked differences by occupational class 
(albeit using crude occupational classifications).  Workers in ‘higher’ occupations 
(i.e. managerial, professional, technical and clerical occupations) spent a higher 
proportion of their lives in regular employment than those in ‘intermediate’ 
occupations (service and sales workers, craftsmen and machinists) who in turn 
spent a higher proportion of their lives in regular employment than workers in 
‘elementary’ (i.e. unskilled) occupations. The proportions of time spent looking for 
work showed an inverse relationship.  Thus, 62 percent of the workers currently in 
higher occupations had spent ‘almost all of the time’ in regular employment, and 
61 percent had spent ‘none of the time’ looking for work, compared to 39 percent 
and 45 percent of workers in elementary occupations.  In short, the extent of 
‘churning’ in the work history of people seemed to be closely and inversely related 
to their occupational class.  Given the close relationship between race and class (in 
Cape Town), these differences were reflected also in different patterns in the work 
histories of coloured and African workers. 
 
The final columns of Tables 13 and 14 extend this analysis to consider African 
adults who were currently unemployed.  The employment histories of the currently 
unemployed were quite distinct, exhibiting chronic disadvantage compared even 
with workers in elementary occupations. Almost half (45 percent) of the African 
adults currently in wage employment said that they had worked as a regular wage 
worker for almost all of their lives, with another 22 percent saying that they had 




currently unemployed were just 8 percent and 10 percent.  The comparable figures 




Table 13: Time spent working as a regular wage worker since leaving 
school, by current occupation or employment status, Cape Town, 2000 
 














Proportion of time 
 
% %  %  % 
Almost all of the time  62  50  39  8 
Most of the time (i.e. 
over half of the time) 
21 25  25  10 
About half of the time  5  8  12  9 
Some of the time (i.e. 
less than half of the 
time) 
7 11 14  15 
None of the time  6  5  9  57 
Total 100  100  100  100 
Note: Higher occupations defined here as Standard Occupational Classifications (SOC) 
codes1000-5000; medium occupations are codes 5000-9000 excepting 5169 (security guards); 
elementary occupations are codes 9000-10000 plus 5169.  Some respondents currently 
categorised as being in regular employment might say they had spent ‘none of the time’ in 
regular wage employment because respondents are given labour market positions on the basis of 
their answers to a set of questions; many working people do not regard their work as ‘proper 
work’ or do not see themselves as having ‘proper jobs’. 
Source: 2000 KMP (Khayelitsha Mitchell’s Plain) survey. 
 
Some of these differences might be related to age.  African adults currently in wage 
employment had a very different age profile to self-employed African adults, for 
example.  Analysis of employment histories by age cohort shows that each 
generation of African adults in Cape Town experienced a high level of ‘churning’, 
but there remained marked differences within each age cohort between adults 
currently in wage employment and those who were currently unemployed.  The 






Table 14: Time spent looking for work since leaving school, by current 
occupation or employment status, Cape Town, 2000 
 














Proportion of time 
  
% %  %  % 
Almost all of the time  5  8  12  31 
Most of the time (i.e. over 
half of the time) 
6 6 11  18 
About half of the time  5  8  10  11 
Some of the time (i.e. less 
than half of the time) 
23 24  23  17 
None of the time  61  55  45  24 
Total 100  100  100  100 
Note: See Table 13 notes. 
Source: 2000 KMP (Khayelitsha Mitchell’s Plain) survey. 
 
The spectrum of vulnerability to unemployment thus seemed to run from people in 
the higher occupations at one end, through skilled and semi-skilled workers, to 
unskilled workers in the middle, then on to casual workers and the unemployed at 
the other end.  Some corroboration for this came from KMPS data on the duration 
of unemployment (to date, for the unemployed, or prior to current job for the 
currently employed).  Table 15 shows that the duration of unemployment was 
related to occupation and labour market status.  Currently unemployed African 
adults had been unemployed for, on average, nearly 33 months.  The most recent 
period of unemployment for people currently working in elementary occupations 
had been 11.5 months, on average, and the equivalent duration of unemployment 
spells for adults in intermediate and higher occupations was shorter still. 
 
 
Table 15: Duration of unemployment, Cape Town, 2000 
 
Current labour market status  Mean duration of unemployment (prior 
to current job, if working) (months) 
In higher occupations  5.6 
In intermediate occupations  9.8 
In elementary occupations  11.5 
Unemployed (African only)  32.8 




     
The KMPS data suggested that there were real class differences within the 
coloured and African population in Cape Town, at the same time as some 
‘churning’ or flux in terms of earnings and incomes.  What is striking is not only 
that some people ‘got ahead’ but also that others clearly ‘fell behind’, dropping into 
a lifetime of intermittent unemployment and sporadic casual employment or, if 





6. Inter-Generational Mobility and the 
Reproduction of Inequality 
 
Data from the PSLSD/KIDS panel and from the retrospective questions in KMPS 
suggest that during the 1990s there was a high level of flux in income due to 
movements in and out of employment but that this flux was uneven across people’s 
working lives, with higher levels of flux among the poor than among the better off. 
  Disadvantage persisted across lifetimes.  Was it also reproduced between 
generations?  Were the children of poor parents destined to remain poor 
themselves?  Or was there a high rate of inter-generational mobility, with the 
children of poor parents becoming rich and, perhaps, the children of rich parents 
becoming poor? 
 
In the later apartheid period, there were high absolute rates of mobility, as white, 
coloured, Indian and finally African people advanced up the occupational 
hierarchy.  For white South Africans, there were also high relative mobility rates, 
as racially discriminatory policies reserved high-paying occupations for them 
whilst racially discriminatory and massive public investment in education meant 
that they secured preferential skills.  For African people, absolute rates of mobility 
were high but relative rates were clearly low: their opportunities to benefit from a 
changing economy were restricted by racial discrimination and educational 
disadvantage.  Within the African population, however, some groups were better 
placed than others to take advantage of new opportunities.  As Schneier (1983) 
found, urban ‘insiders’ were better placed than migrant ‘outsiders’.  If the most 
advantaged section of the black population were the urban ‘insiders’ (with Section 
10(1)(a) through (c) residential rights under the pass laws), then the most 
disadvantaged section were the families of farm-workers evicted off white-owned 




unemployment; resettled without any access to agricultural land, and lacking 
education, non-agricultural skills, access to schools or contacts in urban areas, they 
– and their children – were sentenced to enduring poverty.  By the mid-1990s, the 
African population can be divided into discrete classes, including an ‘underclass’ 
of households doubly disadvantaged in that they had neither any employed 
members nor the social capital necessary to secure employment (Seekings, 2003b). 
 
Unfortunately, there is little quantitative evidence on inter-generational mobility 
at the end of apartheid.  Education is the only aspect of this topic for which there 
is any data.  By the 1990s, education serves as a key mechanism by which 
inequality was transmitted or reproduced across generations.  We have data on, 
first, the importance of education in determining earnings and hence household 
incomes.  This data typically comes from retrospective questions about the 
highest grade attained by working people together with questions on their 
current earnings.  Education is a major determinant of earnings (see further 
Moll, 2000; Lam, 1999; Case and Deaton, 1999; Schultz and Mwabu, 1998; 
Anderson  et al., 2001; Bhorat et al., 2001; Keswell and Poswell, 2002).   
Secondly, we have some data on the relationship between family background 
and a child’s educational progress.  Lam (1999) and Anderson et al. (2001: 46-
7) use 1995 OHS data to show that children’s schooling (measured in terms of 
grade attainment at specific ages) rises with mothers’ and fathers’ education.  
Children living with both parents also perform better than children living with 
one or neither parent (Anderson et al., 2001: 49-50).  The combination of high 
returns to education with a wide dispersion in schooling explains a very large 
part of South Africa’s very high level of inequality in the distribution of income 
(Lam, 1999).   
 
Most surveys only provide this data on education for co-residential generations, 
which means that it is generally limited to adolescents and their parents.   
Unusually, the 1998 KIDS survey of African households in KwaZulu-Natal also 
collected data on the educational achievement of absent parents, allowing 
analysis of inter-generational correlations for older generations.  Burns (2000) 
uses these data to demonstrate a clear correlation between the educational 
attainment of household members and the education of their parents (see also 
Hertz, 2001).  Nimubona and Vencatachellum (2003) show that the correlation 
between successive generations’ education is strongest amongst poor 
households, i.e. that educational dis-advantage is reproduced between 





The relationship between family background and children’s education can be 
demonstrated using class categories (see Seekings, 2003a).  In 1993, fifteen year-
old children in upper-class, semi-professional and intermediate class households 
had, on average, completed grade 7, whereas children of the same age in core 
working-class households had, on average, completed grade 6 only, whilst children 
in marginal working-class households had only completed grade 5. By the age of 
nineteen, differences had widened, with class making a difference of up to three 
grades.  Given the importance of education in determining earnings, children from 
marginal working class backgrounds are much more likely to end up in marginal 
working-class occupations, and children from upper-class backgrounds are much 
more likely to end up in upper-class occupations. Inequality thus tends to be 
reproduced over time.  Whilst the relationship between class and schooling is not 
dissimilar to the relationship between race and schooling as shown in other studies 
(e.g. Case and Deaton, 1999; Lam, 1999), there are also marked differences in 
schooling by class within racial groups (see Seekings, 2003a). 
 
The reasons why inequality is reproduced through education are not difficult to 
identify. Under apartheid, resources were allocated unequally to schools attended 
by poor and rich children (see Van der Berg, 2001, 2002). Pupil-teacher ratios 
varied (although how important this is, remains unclear – see Case and Deaton, 
1999), and the quality of teachers probably varied (see Lemon and Stevens, 1999: 
223, 229). This must have some enduring effect. In schools in poor areas there 
might be no ‘culture of learning’. Poor parents spend less than richer parents on 
their children’s education (Case and Deaton, 1999), especially perhaps at the pre-
school level. They provide a less conducive home environment, and probably are 
also less motivated. Within racial groups, educational achievement is also related 
to parental (especially mother’s) schooling, with the children of well-educated 
parents completing more grades than those with less-educated parents (Anderson et 
al., 2001). All of these factors were recognised by the post-apartheid Department 
of Education (RSA, 2000). 
 
Children enter the labour market with very different amounts of human capital, 
reflecting both the time they spent in school and, no doubt, the quality of that 
schooling, as well as the home environment.  In the past, poor children often left 
school early because of poverty: their parents could not afford to pay fees or buy 
uniforms, or children were required to find employment to supplement household 
income.  (Incentives to leave school declined in the 1990s amidst very high levels 
of unemployment and reformed state policy on fees).   Table 16 shows the mean 
grade attainment of adults in each occupational or labour market category, using 




the households in which they were children and of non-resident fathers (i.e. fathers 































father if not 




Higher occupations  10.6  7.4  7.1  7.0 
Intermediate 
occupations 
8.8 5.6  5.8  6.7 
Elementary 
occupations 
8.3 4.7  5.0  4.6 
In casual 
employment 
7.8 4.0  4.3  4.9 
Unemployed 
(coloured) 
8.6 6.6  6.3  n/a 
Unemployed 
(African) 
8.7 [8.3-9.0]  4.5 [4.0-4.8]  5.0 [4.3-5.5]  5.4 [4.6-5.5] 
Notes: The figures in square brackets in the final row give the range of means for the different types of 
unemployed defined by Nattrass (2003): the higher figures are for active searching unemployed, the lowest 
for passive unemployed, with network-searchers in between; the exception is the final column where these 
sub-categories of the unemployed do not line up in the expected direction.  It is important to note that the 
final column is almost entirely African. 
 
Social capital is also important in securing employment (see also Seekings, 2003b). 
 It might well be the case that people with identical educational qualifications have 
different prospects in the labour market because of the different information, 
attitudes and networks that they inherited or acquired through their contrasting 
social backgrounds. Employers fill vacancies primarily through word-of-mouth via 
their existing workforce.  Almost two-thirds of the KMPS sample got their first job 
through either friends or family, and almost as high a proportion got their current 
or most recent jobs the same way. South Africa is not alone in this, of course (see 
Granovetter, 1974, on the USA), but these tendencies may be more pronounced in 
South Africa.  It appears that the bureaucratic allocation of black labour under 









7. AIDS and Inequality 
 
Studies of distribution often pay insufficient attention to demographic changes.  
Under apartheid, population growth had important consequences for processes 
of social and economic change, including deagrarianisation.  After apartheid, the 
major demographic factor affecting inequality was the mortality and morbidity 
resulting from the AIDS pandemic. As of 2003, an estimated 11 to 14 percent of 
all South Africans were HIV-positive.  This was (and is) a socio-economic crisis 
of major proportions.  AIDS reduced the economic security of households by 
reducing the productivity of (and eventually killing) income-earners whilst 
simultaneously diverting scarce household resources towards medical 
expenditure (Nattrass, 2004).  Women are especially hard-hit because they carry 
the burden of the disease and yet are expected to care for other, HIV positive 
members of the household (Walker and Gilbert, 2002: 82).   
 
There is a growing body of South African research which indicates that the 
impact of AIDS has been devastating at the household level (e.g. Cross, 2001; 
Desmond et al., 2000; Steinberg et al., 2002; Booysen, 2002).  In most of Sub-
Saharan Africa, where agriculture accounts for a significant portion of 
employment and output, there is evidence that HIV/AIDS is having an 
especially detrimental impact on rural households engaged in peasant agriculture 
and hence on food security (IFAD, 2001; de Waal and Tumushabe, 2003).  By 
contrast, South Africa’s experience of de-agrarianisation and the destruction of 
peasant agriculture under apartheid resulted in a situation where most food is 
produced by large, capital-intensive commercial farms.  The impact of AIDS on 
the economic security of poor households in South Africa is thus felt primarily 
through declining employment and earnings rather than declining food 
production.  
 
Survey data from the Free State province indicates that AIDS-affected 
households are in a particularly vulnerable position as they have higher rates of 
unemployment and are more dependent on non-employment income like 
pensions (Booysen, 2002).  This suggests that one or more of the following is 





•  people living in households with limited (if any) access to wage employment 
are more vulnerable to HIV/AIDS infection;  
•  AIDS-affected households have experienced disproportional employment 
losses because of AIDS; and  
•  people living with AIDS migrate to households with pensioners in order to 
be taken care of.    
 
What does this mean for overall inequality?  All else being equal, households 
which lose a breadwinner through AIDS will fall further down the income 
distribution.  If the job is taken by a previously unemployed person, then that 
new employee’s household will move up the income distribution.  The overall 
Gini coefficient will thus remain broadly unchanged.  But if firms react to AIDS 
by shedding employment, then the number of households without any 
breadwinner will rise, thus worsening the Gini coefficient.  If average wages rise 
at the same time (perhaps in response to increased pressure from workers to 
compensate them for the burden of higher medical insurance and health 
expenditure, or perhaps because the average worker is becoming more skilled as 
firms get rid of unskilled workers first) then inequality will worsen further.    
 
Any discussion of the impact of AIDS on distribution requires information about 
the size of the pie (the GDP) and the number of people in need of a slice (the 
population). Different macro-economic models come up with different 
predictions about the impact of AIDS on economic growth (Nattrass, 2004).  All 
predict that AIDS will slow growth but some predict a greater impact than 
others.   
 
If the population falls faster than income, then per capita income will rise.   
While this is theoretically possible, it is not common.  Econometric research 
indicates that AIDS has either had an insignificant impact on the growth of per 
capita income in developing countries (Bloom and Mahal, 1997) or has reduced 
it (Bonnel, 2000).  Bonnel’s results indicate that ‘in the case of a typical sub-
Saharan country with a prevalence rate of 20 percent, the growth rate of per 
capita income would be reduced by 1.2 percentage points a year because of 
AIDS (ibid: 846). Most studies show a decline in per capita income as a result 
of the AIDS pandemic (see Barnett and Whiteside, 2002: 286-7).  But whether 
absolute  per capita income is higher or lower as a result of AIDS in any 
particular country is ultimately an empirical question. Two of the three major 
South African models predict a rise in per capita income, whereas the third 
predicts a fall (see Nattrass, 2004).   However, such results have to be treated 




contingent on the underlying theoretical assumptions, data, and parameter 
estimates and guess-timates.  
 
According to De Waal, AIDS is likely to increase inequality in Africa as, for 
example, some commercial farmers are able to buy up land cheaply from 
families stricken by AIDS, and to employ unskilled labour at low rates (De 
Waal, 2003: 11).  This is unlikely to be significant in South Africa, where there 
is little peasant or subsistence agriculture and it is access to jobs rather than to 
land that drives inequality.  In South Africa, the impact of AIDS on inequality is 
mediated in large part by how government and private firms react to the AIDS 
pandemic by changing the level and type of employment, and the benefits 
available.   
 
If firms react by continuing to decrease their reliance on unskilled labour (a 
trend that started before the AIDS pandemic) and by moving out of economic 
sectors whose customer-base comprises lower-income consumers, then poor 
households will find themselves doubly disadvantaged.  Not only will their 
access to the labour market become ever more tenuous, but the products that 
they purchase may become scarcer (and more costly).  Conversely, relatively 
skilled workers could benefit from greater employment opportunities (as 
production becomes more skill- and capital-intensive) and higher wages (as the 
relative demand for skilled labour increases).  They will probably also live 
longer and more productive lives as firms provide them with greater access to 
antiretroviral treatment.  They will probably also be the first in line to receive 
antiretroviral treatment from government hospitals as the treatment roll-out is 
likely to start in urban hospitals in major industrial areas.  As the cost of 
antiretrovirals decreases, more and more firms are likely to help extend the lives 
of their HIV-positive employees by providing them with access to life-
prolonging medication.  The size of the pie may shrink as a result of AIDS, but 
employed (especially skilled) workers will enjoy a growing share.    
 
South Africa is increasingly divided along class lines with the gap between the 
employed and unemployed being of major importance.  The horrifying element 
that AIDS brings to the picture is that the divide will mean the difference 
between life and death for many people (Nattrass, 2004).  Those without access 
to jobs (especially good jobs) are bearing and will continue to bear the brunt of 
the AIDS pandemic. Whether inequality is lower or higher twenty years from 
now is a moot point.  But over the next couple of decades, inequality will 
probably rise as AIDS lowers growth and slices its way through the poor and 






This analysis of post-apartheid trends in income distribution is bedevilled by the 
highly uneven quality of available data.  But it seems clear that improved 
opportunities for some did not mean improved opportunities for all.  Many 
households, especially African, coloured and Indian households, ‘got ahead’, 
enjoying upward mobility into high-earning occupations.  Workers in formal 
employment generally benefited from rising real wages.  But there was 
considerable flux in incomes, as some workers lost jobs, plunging their households 
into poverty, whilst some unemployed people found employment, improving 
greatly household welfare.  Overall, inequality widened because of the deepening 
unemployment crisis.  Moreover, rapidly changing patterns of mortality and 
morbidity due to AIDS meant many already poor households were pushed deeper 
into poverty, and many poor people experienced poor health and died young.   
People from disadvantaged backgrounds were more vulnerable to the ‘shocks’ of 
unemployment and ill-health, and poorly placed to take advantage of the 
opportunities that were opening at the top end of the income distribution. 
 
South African society might be viewed in terms of a game of ‘snakes’ and 
‘ladders’.  The ‘ladders’ are the jobs that people find, whilst the ‘snakes’ are 
retrenchment, morbidity and mortality of household members.  There are a lot of 
snakes and ladders, but they are not distributed randomly.  At the bottom end of 
society there are few ladders.  Lacking social and human capital, and being more 
vulnerable to AIDS-related illness, households at the bottom face few ladders, i.e. 
few opportunities for upward mobility.  The further up the board one proceeds, the 
more ladders there are: opportunities favour the already advantaged.  En route, 
there are many snakes, but the incidence of snakes declines just as the incidence of 
ladders rises, as one proceeds up the board. 
 
Seekings (2003b) derived a figure representing the major lines of stratification in 
South African society.  This is reproduced in Figure 4.  After apartheid, the top 
cluster of classes had become more multi-racial, with upward mobility into the top 
clusters by African as well as coloured and Indian households.  There are, 
therefore, ladders from the middle cluster of classes into the top cluster.  At the 
bottom end, there are some snakes running down from the middle to the bottom 
cluster, but few ladders leading up in the opposite direction, from the bottom into 
the middle clusters.  Children from households in the top cluster of classes 
generally start the game of snakes and ladders near the top, whilst most children 
from households in the bottom cluster start right at the bottom.  Children from 
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Figure 4. Stratification after apartheid 
 
 
Local studies allow us to describe in more detail the kinds of households at the 
bottom of the post-apartheid social structure.  After apartheid, the poor were 
overwhelmingly ‘rural’.  Unemployment underpinned poverty, and unemployment 
remained especially high in the former bantustans.  A core group of the rural poor 
were former farm-workers, removed to quasi-urban settlements in the bantustans 
under apartheid.  One such area was the QwaQwa bantustan, on the border 
between the (Orange) Free State and Lesotho.  In the mid-1980s, three distinct 
groups could be identified in QwaQwa. The richer of these comprised businessmen 
able to benefit from the dense population resulting from removals.  The 
intermediate group comprised better educated and connected households in and 
around the town of Phutaditjaba, most of whom had been removed when entire 
Free State townships had been evicted.  In the last years of apartheid, this group 
enjoyed privileged access to the manufacturing jobs available in state-subsidised 
enterprises in the bantustans or as commuters to the nearer ‘white’ towns (such as 
Harrismith in the case of Qwa-Qwa).  These jobs were poorly-paid, but they were 
greatly preferable to unemployment.  The mass of poorer households comprised 
primarily former farm-workers settled in the remoter settlements outside 






One reason why these former farm-workers were so poor is that they were evicted 
from farms, without skills, at a time when the mines were cutting back on unskilled 
employment and only rehiring experienced and skilled mineworkers.  The former 
safety-net provided by unskilled employment on the mines was pulled away.   
These former farm-workers also lacked the connections that were so important in 
securing employment in manufacturing or services in the larger towns.  Not only 
were they poor, but their children were disadvantaged by attending poor schools. 
 
In the period 1998 to 1999, researchers revisited Qwa-Qwa.  The closure of many 
of the formerly subsidised businesses had resulted in a rising tide of unemployment 
that affected everyone, including the formerly better-off households in Phutadjitaba 
itself.  The value of remittances had also declined steadily.  By the end of the 
1990s, poverty was mitigated only when households had access to the meagre 
incomes earned in the informal sector or to old-age pensions (Slater, 2001, 2002).  
A survey conducted in Phutadjitaba in 1998 revealed the desperation of households 
in the town.  Three-quarters of the unemployed said they would work for R63 per 
week, which was below the statutory minimum wage and about one-half the value 
of the old-age pension at the time (Nattrass, 2000b).   
 
The end of apartheid meant that farm-workers evicted from farms in the 1990s and 
2000s were not forced into the former bantustans.  Murray examined one group of 
ex-farm-workers in the Free State, who had moved into a shack settlement on the 
edge of the nearest town.  Across the Free State as a whole, the ‘overwhelming 
majority’ of the people in such shack settlements were evicted farm-workers 
(Murray, 2000: 122).  Without local employment, such households relied on 
remittances from migrants or old-age pensions.  A survey conducted in the rural 
Western Cape in 2002 revealed the extent of poverty among households that 
moved off farms into shack settlements around towns, generally because farms 
both reduced their permanent labour-force and were anxious about the liability of 
housing workers on the farms.  Unemployment was rife, and scarce jobs were often 
seasonal only (Du Toit, 2003). 
 
These kinds of households, whether in the Western Cape or the Free State, 
comprised the ‘underclass’.  At best, they rose into the ‘marginal’ working class, 
securing employment on farms, perhaps on a seasonal basis.  Some – including 
especially the immediate family, i.e. wives and children, of migrant workers – 
received remittances, but the value of remittances sent to rural areas was probably 
declining (as rural kin with urban connections moved to town).  Having a job 
meant that farm- and domestic workers were better off then the ‘underclass’, but 




When statutory minimum wages were gazetted for these sectors in 2002-03, the 
state was heedful of job losses and kept the minima low, between R600 and R800 
per month, depending on location. 
 
Given the absence of opportunities in such rural areas, including in small towns, 
why don’t these households migrate to the bigger metropolitan or industrial areas?  
Most local studies of the poor left behind in rural areas don’t address this question. 
 In Phutaditjaba, unemployed people interviewed in 1998 said that they remained 
there because they did not know anyone in the bigger towns and cities (Nattrass, 
2000b).  People of working age who had contacts in the opportunity-richer urban 
labour markets did move.  Given that social – as well as human – capital were 
often spatially located, meaning that some ‘communities’ had more of each than 
others, some rural areas were much less vulnerable to poverty than others.  A case-
study of neighbouring areas on the Eastern Cape coast, in the far south of the 
former Transkei, illustrates this.  In Dwesa (Willowvale), a history of mission 
education, entrepreneurial traditions and migration linkages to Cape Town under 
apartheid resulted, in Dwesa being better off than in Cwebe and Hobani after 
apartheid (in Elliotdale, just across the river from Dwesa).  As Fay and Palmer 
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